Slither Security Audit — Dog Planet Smart Contracts (March 2026)

Slither Security Audit — Dog Planet Smart Contracts

Date: March 27, 2026

Tool: Slither 0.11.5

Scope: contracts/ directory — 90 contracts, 101 detectors

Previous report: SLITHER_AUDIT_20260326 (64 findings)

This report: 41 findings remaining after full remediation pass

Compiler: solc 0.8.20 / 0.8.24 — EVM target: Paris — Hardhat

Compiled files: 79 Solidity files — zero warnings, zero errors

Summary: All High and Medium severity findings from the March 26 audit were fully remediated within 24 hours. The remaining 41 findings are low-risk informational items reviewed and accepted as false positives, intentional design choices inherent to the burn-to-mint architecture, or risks consciously accepted by the team. Dog Planet AS is committed to continuous security improvements.

Executive Summary

Severity	Previous	This Report	Status
High	2	0	✅ All fixed
Medium	1	0	✅ All fixed
Low	1	1	⚠️ Mitigated — batch function added
Informational	60	40	✅ Missing-inheritance cleared; remainder accepted

Severity

This Report

Status

High

✅ All fixed

Medium

✅ All fixed

Low

⚠️ Mitigated — batch function added

Informational

✅ Missing-inheritance cleared; remainder accepted

Fixes Applied in This Pass

H-01 — Divide-Before-Multiply FIXED

Contracts: DogPlanetCoreMining.sol, DOGEVerseRewarder.sol

Precision-loss issues were present in reward calculations (updatePool() and _calculateMetaRewards()) and the week-window rollover in claimBySig(). The previous pattern computed a product then divided by supply before applying the precision multiplier, causing intermediate truncation:

// OLD — precision loss from intermediate division:
uint256 dpcReward = (rate * blocks * totalMinted) / divisor;
accDpcPerShare += (dpcReward * ACC_PRECISION) / totalMinted;

Fixed by merging expressions so ACC_PRECISION is applied before any division. The totalMinted terms cancel:

// NEW — no intermediate truncation:
accDpcPerShare += (rate * blocks * ACC_PRECISION) / divisor;

In DOGEVerseRewarder.claimBySig(), the week-window rollover was changed from a divide-then-multiply pattern to a single modulo expression:

weekStart = block.timestamp - (delta % WEEK_DURATION);

H-02 — Locked Ether via receive/fallback FIXED

Contracts: DogPlanetMetaNFT.sol, DogPlanetSales.sol, DropMinterPass.sol

All three contracts had receive() and fallback() stubs that reverted but were still marked payable, meaning ETH sent would be accepted by the EVM before reverting — a potential locked-ether vector. All stubs have been removed entirely. ETH is now rejected at the EVM level — no payable entry points exist anywhere in these contracts.

M-01 — Reentrancy in DropMinterPass.mint() FIXED

Contract: DropMinterPass.sol

The previous mint() function performed external calls (burnFrom(), mintWithHash()) before updating internal state variables (minted, mintedBy, totalDpsBurned). Fixed by applying the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern: all state variables are updated before any external call is made.

L-01 — Costly Loop in withdrawAllNFTs MITIGATED

Contract: DogPlanetSales.sol

Added withdrawBatchNFTs(address to, uint256 limit) with a hard cap of 1–200 tokens per transaction. Callers should use this for large inventories. The original withdrawAllNFTs is retained for backwards compatibility with a documented gas warning. Both functions are pre-finalization, admin-role-gated only.

I-01 — Missing Interface Inheritance FIXED — fully cleared

Contracts: Multiple

Created six shared interface files in contracts/interfaces/:

Interface File	Implementing Contract
`IBurnableERC20.sol`	`DogPlanetCore`, `DogPlanetSpark`
`IDogPlanetCore.sol`	`DogPlanetCore`
`IDogPlanetSpark.sol`	`DogPlanetSpark`
`IMiningContract.sol`	`DogPlanetCoreMining`
`ICoreEvolve.sol`	`DOGEVerseCore721`
`IDOGEVerseCore721.sol`	`DOGEVerseCore721`

Updated ICodexRegistry.sol to use uint32 for canonicalIndex (matching the implementation). Added latestHash() to CodexRegistry to satisfy the full interface. Removed all duplicate inline interface declarations from contract files. Updated all implementing contracts with explicit is Interface inheritance declarations.

I-02 — Naming Convention Violations FIXED

Contracts: DogPlanetCore, DogPlanetSpark, DogPlanetMetaNFT, DogPlanetSales, DropMinterPass, DogPlanetNFT

Removed leading underscores from all function parameters across the codebase (_minter → newMinter, _enabled → enabled, _price → newPrice, _newBaseURI → newBaseURI, _miningContract → newMiningContract) to comply with Solidity naming standards.

Additional — Missing Zero-Address Check FIXED

Contract: DogPlanetMetaNFT.sol

Added require(newMiningContract != address(0), "Zero address") to setMiningContract().

Remaining Findings — 41 Total (All Accepted or False Positive)

weak-prng (1 finding) — FALSE POSITIVE
DOGEVerseRewarder.claimBySig — block.timestamp % WEEK_DURATION is flagged as weak PRNG. This is a false positive: the expression calculates a deterministic time-window offset. No randomness is involved.

incorrect-equality (1 finding) — ACCEPTED
RemixVault.getTokenRemixInfo — strict equality check is an intentional identity verification confirming a specific history record belongs to the queried token, not a comparison that can be gamed.

unused-return (3 findings) — ACCEPTED
DOGEVerseCore721.evolveWithRarity and RemixVault — calls to codexRegistry.getEntry() intentionally discard the versions array and canonicalIndex; only the rarity header is needed. Return values are syntactically captured with empty slots (h, , ).

calls-loop (multiple findings) — INHERENT TO DESIGN
Batch loops in DogPlanetSales, DogPlanetCoreMining, DogPlanetToken, and RemixVault require external calls per token. These are owner-only or user-bounded batch operations required by the burn-to-mint architecture. The per-call gas cost is unavoidable without moving off-chain or using Merkle proofs.

reentrancy-benign / reentrancy-events (multiple findings) — ACCEPTED
All flagged patterns involve events emitted after external calls where there is no exploitable state reordering. Implementing contracts are either non-payable, guarded by nonReentrant, or have no funds that could be drained.

timestamp (multiple findings) — ACCEPTED
FactionQuestBook, RemixVault, RewardVault, DOGEVerseRewarder use block.timestamp for deadline and window comparisons. The ±15-second miner manipulation window does not create exploitable edge cases for these reward and deadline windows.

costly-loop (4 findings) — INHERENT + MITIGATED
DogPlanetSales._removeToken uses a swap-and-pop pattern inside loops called by both withdrawal functions. Mitigated by the 1–200 batch cap on withdrawBatchNFTs. withdrawAllNFTs retains a documented gas warning.

naming-convention (1 finding) — ACCEPTED (EIP-712 standard)
FactionQuestBook.DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() — all-caps naming is the EIP-712 standard convention adopted by Uniswap, OpenZeppelin, and the broader ecosystem. Renaming would break integrations expecting the standard name.

Compilation Status

79 Solidity files compiled successfully — EVM target: Paris — solc 0.8.20 / 0.8.24 — Hardhat
Zero warnings. Zero errors. All contracts compile cleanly.

Audit Trail

Date	Report	Findings	Notes
2026-03-26	SLITHER_AUDIT_20260326	64	Initial post-development audit
2026-03-27	SLITHER_AUDIT_20260327	41	All High/Medium fixed; interface architecture completed

Date

Report

Findings

Notes

2026-03-26

SLITHER_AUDIT_20260326

Initial post-development audit

2026-03-27

SLITHER_AUDIT_20260327

All High/Medium fixed; interface architecture completed

This report is published by Dog Planet AS for full public transparency.
Dog Planet AS remains committed to continuous security improvements.
A full independent third-party audit will be completed and published before any major protocol upgrades or significant liquidity events.

Last updated: March 27, 2026

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